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One conclusion keeps rising to the surface throughout our lengthy ex-
amination of the role of money in the economic trends of the past
century: John Maynard Keynes "shunted the car of Economic science on
to a wrong line"—to use the words that William Stanley Jevons applied to
an earlier brilliant economist, David Ricardo.
1 Keynes's General Theory
was a reaction to the circumstances of the troubled interwar years. It
offered an hypothesis to explain what seemed a conflict between experi-
ence and the implications of "orthodox" monetary theory. The hypoth-
esis was
the right kind of theory in its simplicity, its concentration on a few key
magnitudes, its potential fruitfulness. [We] have been led to reject it,
not on these grounds, but because [we] believe that it has been contra-
dicted by evidence: its predictions have not been confirmed by experi-
ence. This failure suggests that it has not isolated what are "really" the
key factors in short-run economic change.
The General Theory is profound in the wide range of problems to
which Keynes applies his hypothesis, in the interpretations of the
operation of modern economies and, particularly, of capital markets
that are strewn throughout the book, and in the shrewd and incisive
comments on the theories of his predecessors. These clothe the bare
bones of his theory with an economic understanding that is the true
mark of his greatness.
2
The conclusion in this book that Keynes's hypothesis was unsuccessful
is based on money and income data that were not available to Keynes
himself. That is true for the pre-World War I period and for the interwar
1. The Theory of Political Economy, preface to the 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1879),
p. lvii.
2. Milton Friedman, "Comments on the Critics," in Milton Friedman's Monetary
Framework ed. Robert J. Gordon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 134.
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period itself. In addition, of course, we now have evidence for more than
four decades that have elapsed since the General Theory was published.
Our examination of this body of evidence reveals that Keynes was
generalizing from an idiosyncratic episode—the interwar period in the
United States. The pre-World War I period in the United States and the
United Kingdom, even the interwar period in the United Kingdom, and
the post-World War II period in both countries do not reveal the phe-
nomena that Keynes regarded as contradicting "orthodox" monetary
theory. On the contrary, experience during these periods and in these
countries conforms to that theory very well. Indeed, one of the ironies of
our examination of the evidence is that experience in Keynes's native
United Kingdom conforms to the simplest version of the "orthodox"
theory he attacked better than does experience in the United States.
The view that Keynes's theory, far from being general, as he labeled it,
is highly special, has often been expressed but never documented as fully
as we believe we have been able to do.
12.1 The Phillips Curve
The clearest conflict betweeen our evidence and the expectations en-
gendered by a Keynesian vision is with respect to the relation between
prices and output. Keynes's emphasis on aggregate demand as the prime
mover in economic fluctuations—whether short-term movements within
business cycles or the longer-term movements between cycle phases that
we take as our basic unit in order to abstract from cyclical fluctuations—
led to the expectation that output and prices would move together, both
rising and falling together relative to longer-term trends. That view is
embodied most directly in the negatively sloped Phillips curve, the idea
that if output is high relative to capacity, so that unemployment is low,
prices will tend to rise relative to trend (or inflation to accelerate), and if
output is low relative to capacity, so that unemployment is high, prices
will tend to fall relative to trend (or inflation to decelerate).
We were surprised to find that the typical relation is the reverse, that
prices and output tend to be related negatively for our phase averages,
not positively; that, so far as it exists at all, the Phillips curve—at least for
units of time as long as our cycle phases (averaging two years for the
United States, 2.8 years for the United Kingdom)—is positively, not
negatively, sloping, except only for the idiosyncratic United States inter-
war period (chap. 9).
12.2 Two Extreme Theories
It has been common to contrast two supposedly extreme theories: the
simple quantity theory of money and the simple Keynesian income-623 Two Extreme Theories
expenditure theory (chap. 2). The first theory implies that the velocity of
circulation of money—the ratio of nominal income to the quantity of
money—is a constant aside from errors of measurement of its numerator
and denominator, so that changes in income (i.e., income in dollars or
pounds by contrast with "real" income) mirror changes in the nominal
quantity of money—in Irving Fisher's evocative phrase, income fluctua-
tions are a "dance of the dollar." A somewhat more sophisticated version
that dates back at least two hundred years treats velocity as a stable
function of a small number of variables, including the earlier behavior of
the quantity of money.
3 The second theory implies that the velocity of
circulation of money is a "will-o'-the-wisp" consisting of the ratio of two
essentially independent magnitudes. Fluctuations in nominal income are
linked to fluctuations in investment through the "consumption multi-
plier," so that income is a dance of investment rather than of the dollar. A
somewhat more sophisticated version gives money, and velocity, some
independent status via the possible effect of changes in the quantity of
money on interest rates and thence on investment—both "interest rates"
and "investment" being defined rather narrowly.
Neither theory, in its simple or more sophisticated version, has any-
thing systematic to say about how a change in nominal income is divided
between a change in prices and in output. The quantity theory supposes
output to be determined predominantly by nonmonetary forces and
supposes changes in nominal income that are produced by changes in
money to be reflected ultimately entirely in prices. The Keynesian theory
supposes prices to be determined by nonmonetary forces and supposes
changes in nominal income that are produced by changes in investment to
be reflected entirely in output (so long as employment is less than "full").
Of course, users of both theories have recognized that neither extreme is
correct and have made many illuminating side comments on this issue.
But neither group has succeeded in developing a satisfactory formal
theory to fill this major gap.
We have offered some suggestions about how to do so in our theoreti-
cal framework (sees. 2.6-8), but these are highly tentative. Further, the
chapter in which we attempt to give empirical content to these sugges-
tions (chap. 9) largely records an unsuccessful experiment—though it
does yield some highly important results to which we have already
referred.
The broad survey of our basic time series with which we begin our
empirical analysis (chap. 5) is sufficient to demonstrate that the simple
3. For example, see David Hume, "Of Money" (discourse 3) and "Of Interest" (dis-
course 4) in David Hume, Political Discourses (Edinburgh: Fleming, 1752), pp. 41-59,
61-78; and M. Friedman, "Discussion," at American Economic Association session "The
Rediscovery of Money," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 65 (May
1975): 176-78.624 The Role of Money
Keynesian view can be rejected; the movements in the level of income
and its rate of change parallel extraordinarily closely for more than a
century the contemporaneous movements in the quantity of money and
its rate of change, and this is equally true for the United States and the
United Kingdom. Whichever is the "cause" and whichever the "effect,"
the two magnitudes are clearly not independently determined. Velocity
varies far less than either nominal money or nominal income. Even more
striking, the movements of velocity in the United States parallel those in
the United Kingdom, and so do movements in the rate of change of
velocity.
The one important difference between the two countries that emerges
in this broad survey is that price change accounts for a larger fraction of
the fluctuations in nominal income, and output change for a smaller
fraction, for the United Kingdom than for the United States—a phe-
nomenon that we encounter repeatedly in later chapters.
12.3 The Demand for Money
Velocity is a "real," not a "nominal" magnitude, the monetary units in
numerator and denominator canceling out. Its reciprocal has the dimen-
sion of time, measuring the amount of money held in terms of the number
of time units of income to which that amount of money is equal—so many
weeks or months or other time units of income. In consequence, an
analysis of velocity is equivalent to an analysis of the demand for money
in "real" terms.
We begin our study of the demand for money (chap. 6) by examining in
more detail the agreement between our data and the alternative simple
theories. The conclusion is clear: both can be rejected, but the simple
quantity theory comes far closer to explaining experience than does the
simple Keynesian theory. Somewhat surprisingly, the simple quantity
theory comes even closer to describing experience for the United King-
dom than for the United States. The later chapters show that this result
too reflects the idiosyncrasy of the United States interwar years.
The simple quantity theory does not deserve the denigration that it has
received in recent decades. It is a surprisingly good first approximation
and clearly recommends itself as a better starting point for a more
sophisticated analysis than the simple Keynesian theory. That more
sophisticated analysis reveals the existence of a stable demand function
for money covering the whole of the period we examine. The major
variables that have affected the real quantity of money have, with one
exception, apparently been the same in the two countries. The exception
is the increasing financial sophistication in the United States monetary
system relative to the United Kingdom system before the early 1900s.
Presumably the degree of financial sophistication has continued to play a625 Common Financial System
role in the United States and has been relevant in the United Kingdom all
along, but, since it seems to have been affecting both countries to roughly
the same extent, we have been unable to identify it.
For the rest, the basic forces that we have identified as affecting the real
quantity of money demanded throughout the period have been the level
of real per capita income, the difference between the nominal yields on
money and on other nominal-value assets, and the nominal yield on
physical assets—which we have been able to proxy successfully by the
rate of change of nominal income. In addition, two forces were operative
for part of the period: (1) after both of the major wars, it took time for the
quantity of money demanded to adjust to the drastic change in circum-
stances; (2) the Great Depression in the United States and the stagnation
in the United Kingdom from the mid-1920s until World War II in both
countries produced a temporary upward shift in the quantity of money
demanded for given values of the other variables—a shift we interpret as
reflecting a widespread perception that there was greater economic un-
certainty to which a high desired level of liquidity was one response.
With one exception, the basic forces affecting demand in the United
Kingdom and the United States had roughly the same quantitative impact
in the two countries. The exception is the elasticity of real per capita
money balances with respect to real per capita income. That elasticity was
somewhat higher than unity in the United States, about 1.1, and some-
what lower than unity in the United Kingdom, about 0.9. For yields, we
estimate that a one percentage point (not 1 percent) change in the
differential yield on money would produce something more than a 9
percent (not percentage point) change in the quantity of money de-
manded; a one percentage point change in our proxy for the nominal
yield on physical assets would produce something more than a 0.04
percent change in the quantity of money demanded. However, these
estimates are less securely grounded and subject to a wider margin of
error than the estimated income elasticities.
Not only are the basic forces affecting the quantity of money de-
manded, and their quantitative effects, largely the same in the two
countries, but the single statistical equation that we estimate from data
for the two countries combined leaves about the same residual variation
to be explained in the United States and the United Kingdom by omitted
variables or statistical error—about 5 percent for the level of money
demanded, about 1.5 percentage points for the rate of change of the
quantity of money demanded.
12.4 Common Financial System
The two countries are clearly part of a common financial system, in
which monetary variables—prices, interest rates, nominal incomes,626 The Role of Money
stocks of money—are constrained to keep largely in step except as
changes in exchange rates alter the number of units of one country's
currency equivalent to one unit of the other country's currency. Within
the unified financial system, there is much room for divergence of physi-
cal magnitudes—for example, there is only a loose link between the two
countries in the movements of real per capita income (chap. 7).
Even with respect to financial magnitudes, the unification is far from
complete. We have indirectly been able to examine this issue—to see how
well, for example, the "law of one price" holds—by estimating year-by-
year over the whole of our period the number of United States dollars
that had the same purchasing power as one British pound—the purchas-
ing-power-parity exchange rate. If the "law of one price" were perfectly
satisfied, the purchasing-power-parity exchange rate would equal the
market rate. In fact, it does not do so but fluctuates around the market
rate. Before the early 1930s, the purchasing-power-parity rate stayed
within plus or minus 10 percent of the market rate—a reasonable approx-
imation to the law of one price. After the early 1930s, the variation was
much wider, ranging from 10 percent below to 60 percent above. Govern-
ment intervention in the exchange market since the 1930s has been more
potent in disunifying the markets than improvements in transportation
and communication have been in unifying them (sec. 6.8).
12.5 Dynamic Effects on Nominal Income
A stable demand function for real money balances means that an
autonomous change in either nominal money or nominal income will
have to be accompanied by a corresponding change in the other variable,
or in variables entering into the demand function for money, in order to
equate the desired quantity of money balances with the quantity available
to be held. The parallelism in the temporal patterns of nominal money
and nominal income means that the adjustment comes about primarily
through the other nominal magnitude rather than through the yields or
other variables entering into the demand function for money. Given
stability of money demand, variability in conditions of money supply, and
similar parallelism for the whole of the period, it is appropriate to regard
the observed fluctuations in the two nominal magnitudes as reflecting
primarily an influence running from money to income. The process is
two-way, not unidirectional, so there undoubtedly has also been a feed-
back from income to money, yet the element that gives consistency to the
century as a whole is the influence from money to income.
4
4. Note that this says nothing about "endogeneity" or "exogeneity." Even for the gold
standard period, when the quantity of money is an endogenous variable, the parallel
fluctuations in nominal money and income can reflect primarily an influence running from
money to income.627 Interest Rates
Accordingly, in chapters 8 and 9, we have examined the temporal
pattern of response to changes in the quantity of money—in chapter 8,
the response of nominal income; in chapter 9, of prices and output
separately—with special reference to giving empirical content to the
dynamic patterns in chapter 2. Though not inconsistent with the sugges-
tions in that chapter, the empirical results do not enable us to specify
those hypotheses at all precisely.
The response of nominal income to changes in the nominal quantity of
money is generally cyclical, distributed over a long period, and sharply
damped in amplitude. The cumulative effect is consistent with theoretical
expectation: a sustained one percentage point increase in the rate of
monetary growth ultimately produces a one percentage point increase in
the rate of nominal income growth. However, we have been unable to pin
down at all precisely the magnitude of the transitory effects to be ex-
pected en route to this long-term result.
12.6 Dynamic Effects on Prices and Output
The response of prices, like that of nominal income, is generally
cyclical, distributed over a long period, and sharply damped in ampli-
tude. Except only for the United States interwar period, the ultimate
effect of monetary change is absorbed by prices. There is no persistent
effect on output. Indeed, for the United Kingdom we have not been able
to isolate even transitory effects on output. The change in United King-
dom output from cycle phase to cycle phase behaves like a strictly random
series—white noise in the jargon of stochastic series. That is not true for
the United States, but the output effects are smaller and less consistent
over time than the price effects—again with the conspicuous exception of
the interwar period.
12.7 Interest Rates
According to the simple Keynesian theory, changes in the quantity of
money would be reflected first in changes in the opposite direction in
interest rates, which in turn would affect investment and, through invest-
ment, nominal income. The implied inverse relation between changes in
the quantity of money and in interest rates, widely taken for granted as
recently as the mid-1960s, by now has been thoroughly discredited by the
simultaneous upward trends of the past several decades in the quantity of
money, nominal income, inflation, and interest rates. One result has been
an explosion of economic research into the relation between prices and
interest rates, research inspired largely by the seminal contributions of
Irving Fisher and secondarily by some comments of Keynes in the Trea-
tise on Money, which preceded the General Theory and out of which the
General Theory developed.628 The Role of Money
By now there is general agreement on the theory of the relation
between money and interest rates (sec. 10.1). The theoretical relation is
complex, so that our empirical analysis, based on that theory, offers a rich
understanding of particular episodes but does not yield any simple empir-
ical generalization enabling an observer to predict the effects of monetary
change on interest rates.
Our empirical analysis is devoted primarily to two related themes: the
relation between yields on nominal and on physical assets and the effect
of the level and rate of change of prices on interest rates.
For the century we cover as a whole, nominal yields on nominal assets
roughly equal our proxy for nominal yields on physical assets, averaging
about 4.5 percent for the United States, about 4 percent for the United
Kingdom; short-term nominal assets yielded somewhat less on the aver-
age, long-term nominal assets somewhat more, in line with the wide-
spread belief that liquidity commands a premium. The equality between
yields on nominal assets and our proxy for physical assets is evidence in
favor of the vejidity of our proxy as well as testimony to the existence of
effective arbitrage between different categories of assets over long
periods.
The real yield—the excess of the nominal yield over the average rate of
inflation—averaged about 3 percent for the United States, about 1.25
percent for the United Kingdom. The excess of the United States yield
over the United Kingdom yield is greater for real than for nominal yields
because United Kingdom prices rose on the average more rapidly than
United States prices, a difference that was reflected almost precisely in
the average behavior of the exchange rate.
Arbitrage roughly equated yields on nominal and physical assets for
the century as a whole but not for shorter periods—there is little correla-
tion between the phase-to-phase movements of yields on nominal and
physical assets. During periods of rising prices, physical assets provided
higher yields than nominal assets; during periods of falling prices they
provided lower yields. As between such periods, nominal yields were
much stabler for nominal than for physical assets; real yields were much
less stable. The conclusion is inescapable: for the greater part, inflation
and deflation were not accurately anticipated and therefore were not
reflected in the terms on which nominal assets were acquired: lenders did
not succeed in protecting themselves against having their real returns
eroded by inflation; borrowers did not succeed in protecting themselves
against having their real interest payments increased by deflation.
The greater stability of the real yield on physical assets than on nominal
assets does not reflect greater foresight by their holders. It reflects the
absence of advance contractual arrangements. Yields on physical assets
are realized mostly as a difference between receipts from the physical629 Interest Rates
assets and costs (other than the return on physical capital) of acquiring
those receipts. Inflation and deflation affect both receipts and costs. A
measure of automatic indexing, as it were, stabilizes the real return on
physical assets.
The importance of anticipations as opposed to realizations is high-
lighted by one particularly instructive episode. That episode is the transi-
tion from the fear that the United States would go off the gold standard,
produced by the free silver movement before 1896, to confidence in the
maintenance of the gold standard following McKinley's election in 1896.
From 1873 to 1896, the short-term interest rate in the United States was
slightly higher on the average than it was from 1896 to 1914, although
prices on the average were falling by nearly 2 percent a year before 1896
and rising by nearly 2 percent a year after 1896. In the United Kingdom,
by contrast, the short-term interest rate was slightly lower on the average
before than after 1896. The United States rate averaged about 2.5 per-
centage points higher than the United Kingdom rate before 1896, less
than 1.5 percentage points higher than the United Kingdom rates after
1896.
These seemingly paradoxical results are readily explicable. Before
1896, the political strength of the free silver movement made it entirely
reasonable for farsighted investors to anticipate inflation. The fact turned
out to be deflation; the anticipation was inflation. The investors proved to
be wrong—but there was no way anyone could know that in advance, no
evidence that would have in advance contradicted a personal probability
judgment that the probability of inflation was decidedly greater than 50
percent. After 1896, the fact was inflation; the anticipation was stability
or deflation. The shift in anticipations reduced the differential between
United Kingdom and United States interest rates: investors in the United
Kingdom presumably shared the fears of those in the United States and
hence were reluctant to lend in the United States before 1896 except at a
premium that compensated them for the possibility of a devaluation of
the dollar relative to the pound. After 1896 this premium was no longer
necessary; the remaining excess simply reflected the premium required to
compensate for investing abroad rather than at home—a differential to
be expected between a capital-importing country, such as the United
States then was, and a capital-exporting country, such as the United
Kingdom then was. After World War I, the United States too became a
capital exporter and, while the real yield in the United States remained
higher than in the United Kingdom, the excess declined by about one
percentage point. Nominal yields became higher in the United Kingdom
than in the United States, reflecting the depreciation of the pound rela-
tive to the dollar.630 The Role of Money
12.8 Rational Expectations
The free silver episode is especially instructive with respect to the
proper interpretation of the recently popular theory of rational expecta-
tions. In applying this idea, it is common to proceed on two assumptions:
(1) that participants in whatever market is considered have "correct"
estimates of the probability distribution of outcomes (itself something
that is difficult or impossible to define objectively), so that on the average
anticipations are correct; and (2) that errors of forecast in successive time
units are uncorrelated. This episode brings out sharply the difficulty of
giving a precise meaning to the first assumption, and the ambiguity of
"time unit" for the second assumption. For that episode, the relevant
time unit is about twenty years—so that averaging out may take a long
time. Our analysis gives one example: the real yield on nominal assets
matches the real yield on physical assets only for the whole century our
data cover.
The formalization in the theory of rational expectations of the ancient
idea that economic actors use available information intelligently in judg-
ing future possibilities is an important and valuable development. But it is
not the open sesame to unraveling the riddle of dynamic change that
some of its more enthusiastic proponents make it out to be.
12.9 Fisher and Gibson
Irving Fisher was an early and sophisticated user of the basic idea of
rational expectations. His expectation (in 1896) that nominal interest
rates would be relatively high during periods of rising prices and rela-
tively low during periods of falling prices was based on the view that
lenders and borrowers seek to anticipate price movements and allow for
them in the interest rates they are willing to accept or to pay. His
examination of empirical evidence persuaded him that there was an effect
in this direction but that it was very much damped—the conclusion that
we too have reached on the basis of experience for a much longer period.
He suggested an explanation in terms of the slowness with which partici-
pants adapted their anticipations to experience, leading to an appearance
that interest rates vary with the price level rather than the rate of price
change.
At about the same time, Knut Wicksell was impressed by the same
empirical observation that prices and interest rates apparently moved
together—the observation that Keynes later termed the Gibson para-
dox—and suggested an explanation in terms of the slowness with which
banks adapted their anticipations to changes in the productivity of physi-
cal capital. Keynes offered a variant of this explanation for the same
phenomenon more than two decades later.631 Fisher and Gibson
Our interest in the effect of monetary change on interest rates naturally
led us to examine the relation between the level and rate of change of
prices and interest rates, because the effect of monetary change on prices
is a major channel through which monetary change affects interest rates.
Our examination of the evidence confirms the doubts expressed by
Frederick Macaulay more than forty years ago about the generality of the
Gibson phenomenon. It does not exist over very long periods. It fre-
quently does not exist over short periods. In particular, it is present
before World War I in both the United States and the United Kingdom,
though apparently, according to studies by Gerald Dwyer, not in some
other countries. There are traces of it in the interwar period, almost none
in the post-World War II period. The major change in price level from
before to after World War I leaves no reflection at all in the level of
interest rates. In short, there has at times been a Gibson phenomenon;
there is no Gibson paradox.
Wicksell's and Keynes's suggested explanation of the Gibson phe-
nomenon is clearly contradicted by the evidence and can definitely be
rejected. Fisher's explanation is not, though it must be modified from his
final (1930) version, in which he regarded participants as forming their
anticipations of future price change as a very long weighted average of
past price change. The modifications are, first, that the period of averag-
ing is much shorter than Fisher estimated it to be, though still lengthy—
something like six to nine years rather than the much longer period he
estimated—and, second, that participants also take into account other
relevant episodic evidence, such as the free silver movement.
A sharp break has apparently occurred in recent years in the relation
between price change and interest rates in both the United States and the
United Kingdom. Since about the mid-sixties, a close relation between
interest rates and the rate of price change has emerged for the first time in
the century we study. Gibson has been replaced by the original Fisher.
Nominal returns have become more variable than real returns; nominal
returns on nominal assets are as variable as nominal returns on physical
assets. Lenders and borrowers apparently have been able to predict price
changes more accurately and to adjust the terms of lending and borrow-
ing accordingly.
This break has been noted by other investigators. Like Benjamin
Klein, we are inclined to attribute the break to a belated and gradual
recognition by market participants of the drastic change in the monetary
system from a largely specie standard to a fiduciary standard. One caveat
is in order: the extent of the shift may have been exaggerated by the
failure to allow for the effect of taxes on the real yield from nominal assets
during an inflationary period. This is a complex issue that is far from
settled. In any event, whether the shift in pattern proves permanent or
temporary is likely to depend on future developments in the monetary
system and on the future course of inflation.632 The Role of Money
12.10 Long Swings
Our final substantive chapter (chap. 11) applies our findings to a fairly
extensive body of research on long swings in economic activity. This
research has examined swings in economic activity of a decidedly longer
duration than business cycles, swings that encompass several business
cycles. Investigators have documented such swings for the United States
in many physical magnitudes for roughly the century our study covers.
They have been asserted to exist but not comparably documented for the
United Kingdom, as well as other countries.
Some investigators have maintained that these swings reflect a self-
generating cyclical process of longer duration than the ordinary business
cycle and have offered a series of hypotheses about the economic forces
producing them.
It is a remarkable testament to the extent to which the Keynesian
revolution dominated economic research during the period when the
initial research on long swings was done that no investigator we have been
able to uncover paid more than the most casual attention to the behavior
of the quantity of money or nominal income during the asserted long
swings or to the role that monetary phenomena might play. The investi-
gators restricted themselves to "real" phenomena in the sense of physical
magnitudes—an extreme example of the widespread view that "money
does not matter." More recently, there has been a welcome recognition
by some leading investigators of long swings of the necessity of incorpo-
rating monetary magnitudes into their analysis.
Our data demonstrate that Hamlet has been left out of most long-swing
research. The swings isolated in the physical magnitudes have their
counterpart in the nominal magnitudes. More important, the swings in
the nominal magnitudes are wider in amplitude and more clearly marked
than in the physical magnitudes. No explanation of long swings is accept-
able that does not account for the monetary phenomena.
The observed swings may reflect a self-generating cyclical mechanism,
as some investigators have claimed, or they may represent the smoothing,
by the economic process or statistical procedures, of episodic disturb-
ances. Our data strongly support the episodic interpretation.
Long-swing research is a clear example of a branch of economics that
has been "shunted ... on to a wrong line": masses of sophisticated
statistical data and economic analysis; many useful empirical results, yet
its basic theoretical generalizations null and void thanks to a shuttered
vision.